## AMENDMENT TO RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 118–36

## OFFERED BY MR. BARR OF KENTUCKY

At the end of subtitle C of title XXVII, insert the following new section:

1	SEC. 27 AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR
2	COUNTERING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
3	CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.
4	(a) Countering the People's Republic of
5	CHINA MALIGN INFLUENCE FUND.—
6	(1) In general.—There is authorized to be
7	appropriated \$400,000,000 for each of fiscal years
8	2025 through 2029 for the Countering the People's
9	Republic of China Malign Influence Fund to counter
10	the malign influence of the Chinese Communist
11	Party and the Government of the People's Republic
12	of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.
13	(2) Availability; amounts in addition to
14	OTHER AMOUNTS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant
15	to the authorization of appropriations under para-
16	graph (1)—
17	(A) are authorized to remain available
18	until expended; and

1	(B) shall be in addition to amounts other-
2	wise authorized to be appropriated for the pur-
3	poses described in paragraph (1).
4	(b) Consultation Required.—The obligation of
5	funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of ap-
6	propriations under subsection (a) or otherwise made avail-
7	able for the purposes described in subsection (a)(1) shall
8	be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with
9	section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
10	U.S.C. 2394–1), the regular notification procedures of—
11	(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
12	the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
13	(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
14	Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
15	resentatives.
16	(c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Ap-
17	PROVAL.—
18	(1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
19	shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
20	partment of State to provide policy guidance, coordi-
21	nation, and approval for the obligation of funds ap-
22	propriated pursuant to the authorization of appro-
23	priations under subsection (a).
24	(2) Assistant Coordinator.—The Adminis-
25	trator of the United States Agency for International

1	Development shall designate an existing senior offi-
2	cial of the United States Agency for International
3	Development to assist and consult with the senior
4	official of the Department of State designated pur-
5	suant to paragraph (1).
6	(3) Duties.—The senior official of the Depart-
7	ment of State designated pursuant to paragraph (1)
8	shall be responsible for—
9	(A) on an annual basis, the identification
10	of specific strategic priorities for using funds
11	appropriated pursuant to the authorization of
12	appropriations under subsection (a), such as ge-
13	ographic areas of focus or functional categories
14	of programming that funds are to be con-
15	centrated within, consistent with the national
16	interests of the United States and the purposes
17	of this section;
18	(B) the coordination and approval of all
19	programming conducted using such funds,
20	based on an assessment that such programming
21	directly counters the malign influence of the
22	Chinese Communist Party or the Government
23	of the People's Republic of China, including
24	specific activities or policies advanced by the
25	Chinese Communist Party or the Government

1	of the People's Republic of China and entities
2	acting on their behalf globally, pursuant to the
3	strategic objectives of the United States, as es-
4	tablished in the 2017 National Security Strat-
5	egy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and
6	other relevant national and regional strategies
7	as appropriate;
8	(C) ensuring that all programming ap-
9	proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such
10	activities of the Chinese Communist Party or
11	the Government of the People's Republic of
12	China described in subsection (d) and adheres
13	to the requirements outlined in subsection (e);
14	and
15	(D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
16	evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
17	ming conducted using such funds to ensure that
18	it advances United States interests and de-
19	grades the ability of the Chinese Communist
20	Party or the Government of the People's Re-
21	public of China, to advance activities that align
22	with subsection (d) of this section.
23	(4) Interagency coordination.—The senior
24	official of the Department of State designated pur-
25	suant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and

1	approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2),
2	seek—
3	(A) to conduct appropriate interagency
4	consultation; and
5	(B) to ensure, to the maximum extent
6	practicable, that all approved programming
7	functions in concert with other Federal activi-
8	ties to counter the malign influence of the Chi-
9	nese Communist Party or the Government of
10	the People's Republic of China.
11	(d) Malign Influence.—In this section, the term
12	"malign influence", with respect to the Chinese Com-
13	munist Party or the Government of the People's Republic
14	of China, shall be construed to include acts conducted by
15	the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the
16	People's Republic of China, or entities acting on their be-
17	half that—
18	(1) undermine a free and open international
19	order;
20	(2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
21	national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist
22	Party's or the Government of the People's Republic
23	of China's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized
24	by coercion and dependency;

1	(3) undermine the national security or sov-
2	ereignty of the United States or other countries; or
3	(4) undermine the economic security of the
4	United States or other countries, including by pro-
5	moting corruption and advancing coercive economic
6	practices.
7	(e) Countering Malign Influence.—In this sec-
8	tion, countering malign influence through the use of funds
9	appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropria-
10	tions under subsection (a) shall include efforts—
11	(1) to promote transparency and accountability,
12	and reduce corruption, including in governance
13	structures targeted by the malign influence of the
14	Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the
15	People's Republic of China;
16	(2) to support civil society and independent
17	media to raise awareness of and increase trans-
18	parency regarding the negative impact of activities
19	related to the Belt and Road Initiative, associated
20	initiatives, other economic initiatives with strategic
21	or political purposes, and coercive economic prac-
22	tices;
23	(3) to counter transnational criminal networks
24	that benefit, or benefit from the malign influence of

1	the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of
2	the People's Republic of China;
3	(4) to encourage economic development struc-
4	tures that help protect against predatory lending
5	schemes, including support for market-based alter-
6	natives in key economic sectors, such as digital econ-
7	omy, energy, and infrastructure;
8	(5) to counter activities that provide undue in-
9	fluence to the security forces of the People's Repub-
10	lic of China;
11	(6) to expose misinformation and
12	disinformation of the Chinese Communist Party's or
13	the Government of the People's Republic of China's
14	propaganda, including through programs carried out
15	by the Global Engagement Center; and
16	(7) to counter efforts by the Chinese Com-
17	munist Party or the Government of the People's Re-
18	public of China to legitimize or promote authori-
19	tarian ideology and governance models.
20	(f) Annual Summary.—Not later than September
21	30, 2025, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the senior
22	official of the Department of State designated pursuant
23	to subsection $(e)(1)$ shall submit to the congressional com-
24	mittees specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection

1	(b), a summary identifying each activity or program ap-
2	proved pursuant to subsection (c), and shall include—
3	(1) for each program or activity, an identifica-
4	tion of the country or regional location of the pro-
5	gram or activity;
6	(2) for each program or activity, whether the
7	program or activity was ongoing prior to receiving
8	support from funds from the Countering People's
9	Republic of China Malign Influence Fund, or any
10	predecessor resource intended for the same or sub-
11	stantially similar purpose;
12	(3) for each program or activity, an identifica-
13	tion of the acts described in subsection (d) that such
14	program or activity is intended to counter; and
15	(4) a table identifying the respective allocation
16	of all programs or activities approved during that
17	fiscal year across accounts and regional or functional
18	bureaus.

